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Five Sides of Justice:
The Dangerous and Disproportionate
Influence of the Permanent Five Members
of the UN Security Council on the
International Criminal Court
Nathan Hogan1

E

arly in the morning on April 4, 2017, a one-story
building in the district of Khan Sheikhoun, Syria
exploded in a thick cloud of mustard yellow. As the
cloud settled, those nearby began to experience irritated
eyes, constricted pupils, shortness of breath, foaming
at the mouth, and asphyxiation. 86 people were killed.2
Government officials in Damascus claimed that the
attack was carried out by separatist groups.3 However, a report
released by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons and the United Nations’ Joint Investigative Mechanism
concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for the
attack and had used chemical weapons on its own citizens.4
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the international
body charged with holding individuals and regimes accountable
for war crimes, which include the use of chemical weapons.
However, efforts to bring the Syrian government to justice for
these crimes have been unsuccessful. The ICC does not have
jurisdiction over many states, including Syria. Nevertheless, in
cases where the ICC does not have jurisdiction, the UN Security
Council can use its power to refer a criminal for prosecution
at the ICC.5 However, despite support from all other members
of the Security Council, Russia and China both vetoed a draft
resolution calling for the crisis in Syria to be referred to the ICC
in 2014.6 This opportunity for the Security Council to protect the
Syrian people and prosecute confirmed war criminals was lost.
Unfortunately, rather than making it easier to prosecute
elusive war criminals, the Council’s power to refer states to
the ICC complicates the pursuit of justice. Multiple heads of
state should be referred to the ICC but are not because these
prospective criminals have allies among the permanent five
members of the Security Council. The permanent five members
use their veto power to protect their allies from prosecution by
the ICC. Criminals responsible for abductions of homosexual men
in Chechnya, excessive police brutality in Gaza, and genocide in
Myanmar have not been referred to the ICC because of the strong
allegiances they have with Russia, the United States, and China.7
The rules regarding decision-making on the Security Council create
inefficiency and impede the execution of justice. The ICC referral
process is a compelling example of this inefficiency. The Council
should be reformed so that the members can override the veto of
5
6
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Rome Statute, art. 13, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3844.

Meetings Coverage, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft
Resolution, United Nations Security Council, May 22, 2014, https://
www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017 (2017), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.
pdf.
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a permanent member with a supermajority of the 15 members.
Part I of this paper will explain the purpose of the
International Court and the conditions under which it may
claim jurisdiction. Part II explores the limitations of the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction and the need for further means of
expanding its influence. Additionally, this part will detail the
process by which a non-state party may be referred to the Court
by the Security Council. Part III outlines the history of UN war
tribunals and referrals to the ICC by the Security Council. Part
IV demonstrates how the political considerations of the Security
Council can severely inhibit the Court’s mandate to end impunity.
Part V explores the history of past possibilities of Security
Council reform and proposes the veto override to circumvent
the political influence of the permanent five members.
I. The Structure & Function of the
International Criminal Court

The most important role of the ICC in the multilateral
international system is to provide justice, end impunity, and
establish the rule of law by prosecuting individuals for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Articles 6, 7, and 8 of
the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC, give specific
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
over which the ICC has jurisdiction.8 The other forms of jurisdiction
assumed by the ICC are territorial jurisdiction over crimes that
occur within the borders of states party to the Rome Statute,
voluntary jurisdiction over a state that has willingly submitted
to the ICC’s authority, and special jurisdiction over cases referred
to the ICC by the Security Council.9 Furthermore, the ICC is a
complementary, supranational court, meaning it is not intended
8
9

Rome Statute, art. 6-8.

Rome Statute, art. 13 and art. 5.
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to override national courts.10 Article 17 of the Rome Statute states
that the Court only has jurisdiction when national courts are
unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes.11 Therefore, the Office
of the Prosecutor can only act to open a prosecution when a
case meets the aforementioned jurisdictional criteria and a state
has neglected to prosecute crimes within its own legal system.
These restrictive conditions make it difficult for the ICC to end
impunity because many war criminals are outside its jurisdiction.
II. Limitations of Territorial Jurisdiction

The territorial jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court is limited to the 124 states which are currently parties to
the Rome Statute, or to those states which otherwise consent to
its jurisdiction by filing a declaration with the Court.12 With over
100 nations having declined to become party to the Rome Statute,
including Russia, the United States, and China, the only way that
the ICC could prosecute crimes in these states would be if the
situation were referred by the Security Council, or if the state
itself voluntarily chose to allow the ICC to open an investigation
concerning a crime committed inside its borders.13 Unfortunately,
few states submit to the ICCs jurisdiction voluntarily, and as
mentioned above, the Security Council is hindered by political
interests. These and other limitations make it very difficult for
the ICC to preserve justice within the international system. For
10

11
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Sidney McKenney, The United States’ Need to Ratify the Rome Statute:
The United States and its International Obligation (May 17, 2013) (PhD
dissertation, James Madison University),
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/17/the-united-states-need-to-ratifythe-rome-statute.
Id.

Jurisdiction over a consenting state that is not party to the Rome
Statute will hereafter also be referred to as voluntary jurisdiction.
Understanding the International Criminal Court, Registry, International Criminal Court, 2002.
Rome Statute, art. 13.
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example, if a state fails to prosecute a perpetrator of a war crime,
this criminal could escape prosecution by the ICC if he or she
committed a crime in one of the states that has not signed nor
ratified the Rome Statute. Heads of state or government officials
could easily escape prosecution by removing themselves from the
group of states party to the ICC and thereby ending the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction within the boundaries of their nation.14
Some states that lie outside of the ICC’s territorial
jurisdiction, such as Syria15 and North Korea 16 are prominently
suspected of crimes against humanity. In 2013, this suspicion
was confirmed when the United Nations formed a commission
of inquiry to investigate such crimes in North Korea.17 Thus far,
these states have been unwilling to submit to the ICC through
voluntary jurisdiction.18 Relying solely on territorial or voluntary
jurisdiction under its own authority, the court is severely
limited in its ability to fulfill its mission of ending impunity.
       
The delegates in Rome recognized this limitation. To
avoid the prospect of an international court that cannot obtain
jurisdiction over international criminals, the Statute gives the
ICC the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of
states that are not parties to the Statute and have not otherwise
consented to the court’s jurisdiction. Article 13 of the Rome
Statute allows the Court to exercise its jurisdiction within a state if
14

Id.

15

About the Syria Crisis, United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-profile/about-crisis (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).

16

17
18

Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC.34.66 (Feb. 22, 2017).
G.A. Res. 22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013).

Peter Popham, “North Korea refutes war crimes charge and says
human rights system is ‘advantageous’” The Independent, Nov. 18,
2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korearefutes-war-crimes-charge-and-says-its-human-rights-system-isadvantageous-9868982.html.
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a crime is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Chapter
VII states that the Security Council “has primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security” under
the UN Charter.19 This clause allows the Council to respond to any
threat to international security by referring a state to the ICC.
III. History of War Tribunals and
Security Council Referrals

The UN Security Council is composed of 15 member
states of the United Nations. Five of these are permanent
members with veto power: The United States, China, Russia,
Britain, and France. The other 10 members of the Council
are rotating members who are chosen from each of the five
global geographical regions: Latin America and the Caribbean,
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe.20 Each
region generally nominates two countries, and the final
decision is made through a vote in the UN General Assembly.21
To refer a crime to the ICC, the Security Council must
include the referral in a resolution. In order for the resolution
to pass, it must receive nine out of fifteen votes in support. If
one of the permanent five members of the Security Council uses
their veto power to vote against the resolution, it does not pass.22
The countries who have ratified the UN Charter have
authorized the Council to do what is necessary to maintain peace
in the international system. Under this authority, the Security
Council formed criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda23
19
20

Charter of the United Nations, art. 24. Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S.

21

Id.

22
23

U.N. Charter, art. 23.
U.N. Charter, art. 27.
Id.
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and extended ICC jurisdiction to Libya24 and Darfur.25 States that
are not party to the ICC can still fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction if
the Security Council uses its power under Article 23 to refer a state
to the ICC.26 The Security Council’s ability to refer individuals to
the ICC for prosecution can overcome the limitations mentioned
above. Ideally, it is the most effective way for the ICC to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes in rogue states that do
not fall under the Court’s territorial or voluntary jurisdiction.27
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) addressed crimes committed within the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991and laid the foundations
for conflict resolution across the globe. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established to
bring justice to those responsible for the serious violations of
international law that occurred during the Rwandan genocide.
A campaign of violence perpetrated by governmentbacked Arab militias against African tribes in Darfur, Sudan’s
western region, has claimed more than 70,000 civilian victims
and uprooted an additional estimated 1.8 million people.28
Under President Al-Bashir, Sudan signed the Rome Statute on
September 8, 2000, but the Sudanese government never ratified
the treaty.29 Security Council referral was the only way that the

24
25

S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).

26

S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
Id.

27

Id.

28

Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, Foreign Affairs, Feb.
2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sudan/2005-01-01/
darfur-and-genocide-debate.

29

Darfur, Sudan. Situation in Darfur, Sudan ICC-02/05, International
Criminal Court, February 2005,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur.
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ICC could obtain jurisdiction over the criminals in Darfur.30 The
council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC in March of 2005.
Human rights violations and war crimes committed by
Muammar Gadaffi’s government during the Libyan Civil War also
attracted the attention of the international community. Libya
was also not party to the Rome Statue, and therefore not under
the Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Security Council referred
the situation to the ICC in 2011. The Council’s decision regarding
Libya was made by consensus, with the approval of various
permanent members with veto power who also are not party
to the Rome Statute such as the United States, Russia, and China.31
IV. Problems with Security Council Referrals

Although all of the aforementioned actions taken by the
Security Council were relatively successful in bringing justice to
perpetrators of war crimes in these countries, they have also been
met with criticism. Many political scientists argue that because
the ICTY was established by the Security Council rather than the
General Assembly, it lacks the broad international basis required
of a valid international court.32 These criticisms established the
foundation for the argument that the Security Council exercises
illegitimate levels of control over the ICC because of the unequal
powers of the permanent five members of the Security Council.
The debate regarding the referral of the situation in Darfur to the
ICC focused on the United States and its longstanding opposition
30

31

32

Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, United Nations Security
Council, (Mar. 31, 2005), https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/
sc8351.doc.htm.
Steven Groves and Brett Schaefer, The Motivation for the Referral of
Libya to the ICC: Political Pressure or Justice? The Heritage Foundation, Mar. 4, 2011.

Hemi Mistry and Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, The UN Security Council and
the International Criminal Court, International Law Meeting Summary,
with Parlimentarians for Global Action, Chatham House, March 16,
2012.
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to the Court out of fear that US government and military officials
would be prosecuted unfairly at the ICC.33 The US approved the
final text of the resolution only because it included a provision
that citizens of a contributing State which was not a party to the
Rome Statute would only be subject to voluntary jurisdiction.34
This specification prevented the US from using its veto to
block the Council’s referral.35 Although the resolution passed
after the US chose to abstain from the vote, the fact that one
member of the Council could have singlehandedly prevented
the ability to pursue justice for war crimes is disconcerting.
The circumstances in Libya highlighted the politicization
of the Court due to the Security Council referral process. Many
international relations scholars argue that the referral only
happened because the permanent five members had a stake in
the conflict.36 Why should only Libya be prosecuted by the ICC
when there were many other states that fit the same criteria
but were not referred? There are many other examples of rogue
states that break international human rights law and should be
prosecuted at the ICC. However, unlike Libya, these nations have
allies on the Security Council. Claims of genocide in the civil war
in Syria, atrocities occurring in prison camps in North Korea,
unlawful detention and torture in Iran and the Philippines, and
indiscriminate attacks on children in Yemen are all examples
of cases where justice is impeded by the veto power of one of
33

34

Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in
Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to
the Court: Implications for the International Criminal Court’s Functions
and Status, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, (2006).

35

Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan
to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release
SC/8351, United Nations Security Council, Mar. 31, 2005,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.

36

Id.

Libya. Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11, International Criminal Court,
February 2011,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya.
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the permanent five members of the UN Security Council.37
Because the five permanent members of the Security
Council can use their veto power without restraint, some argue
that the UN does not adequately represent current power
dynamics between states. As the balance of power among
nations began to shift and diversify in the late twentieth century,
international scholars and diplomats began calling for Security
Council reform that better reflected the true balance of power
in the international system.38 Although some of the original
permanent five members of the Council have begun to support the
individual bids that specific countries have made for permanent
membership and veto power, the majority of the permanent
five members remain opposed to changing the status quo and
relinquishing their own power within the main body responsible
for drafting and passing international law.39 For example,
although most of the permanent five members have shown
some level of support for India’s bid for permanent membership,
China vehemently refuses to allow it.40 China also loudly
opposes Japan’s quest for permanent membership.41 Despite
the strong opposition to change in the Security Council, reform
is necessary to ensure that the Council maintains its legitimacy.
This paper provides a solution for the current limitations
of ICC jurisdiction to bring war criminals to justice when these
criminals are being shielded from prosecution by one or more
of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Such a
37
38

39

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017, (2017) https://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf.

Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, World Politics, Continuity and Change
Since 1945, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Nov.
2008).

40

Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security
Council Reform, (Routledge 2005).

41

Id.

Vinay Kaura, “India-Japan Relations and Asia’s Emerging Geopolitics”,
Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1/2, (June-Dec. 2016),
pp. 17-38.
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solution is also necessary because controversy has arisen over the
apparent selectiveness of the Security Council in making referrals
to the ICC. Given that Security Council decisions are made by
political rather than judicial figures, these referral decisions are
sometimes affected by the political affiliations of its members,
particularly the five permanent members. On May 22, 2014, both
China and Russia cast negative votes to veto a draft resolution
that would refer Syria to the ICC for its abuse of human rights.42
Syria is not the only case where the politicization of
the Security Council has impeded justice. Ethnic, religious,
and linguistic minorities in Myanmar have been subject
to extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, socio-economic
exploitation, forced displacement, and denial of citizenship since
the 1980s.43 However, this case has not been referred to the ICC
because of Myanmar’s close relationship with China. Bilateral
trade between China and Myanmar exceeds $1.4 billion, and
China is the chief beneficiary of Myanmar’s extensive oil and
natural gas reserves.44 Access to Myanmar’s ports and naval
installations provides China with strategic influence in the Bay of
Bengal, in the wider Indian Ocean region, and in Southeast Asia.45
The military regime in Myanmar is also protected from referral
through its close relationship with Russia. Russia negotiated a
nuclear research deal with Myanmar in 2007,46 and Myanmar is
42

43

SC/11407, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, https://www.
un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.

44

Michael Bristow, Chinese dilemma over Burma protests, BBC News,
Sept. 25 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7011746.stm.

45

Id.

46

Lixin Geng, Sino-Myanmar Relations: Analysis and Prospects, The Culture Mandala, Vol. 7 no. 2, Dec. 2006.
Russia and Burma in Nuclear Deal, BBC News, May 15, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6658713.stm.
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a major Russian weapons buyer.47 In 2007, both China and Russia
vetoed a Security Council resolution meant to punish Myanmar
for its consistent violation of international human rights law.48
With such bleak track records in protecting human rights,
it may be less surprising that China and Russia have obstructed
international law. However, they are not the only permanent five
members who have let politics determine their decision in the
ICC referral process. Since March 2015, Saudi Arabia has been
carrying out a massive bombing campaign against Yemen, leaving
well over 12,000 people dead.49 The conflict has its roots in a
rebellion that forced Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi
to hand over power to Shia Houthis rebels.50 Alarmed by the rise
of the Houthis, who they believe to be backed militarily by Iran,
Saudi Arabia began an air campaign aimed at restoring Mr. Hadi’s
government.51 War crimes have been committed by both Houthi
forces and the Saudi military.52 Yemen and Saudi Arabia are not
party to the Rome Statute; therefore Security Council intervention
is required for the ICC to claim jurisdiction. However, both the
United States and the United Kingdom oppose any action by the
ICC in Yemen because both countries make substantial sums
of money selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. Since the beginning
of the war, the UK has approved 194 export licenses for arms
and related equipment to Saudi Arabia, totaling more than four
47

48

Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms
Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for
Russia, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham House, Mar. 2017.

49

Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, Russia’s Role as an Arms
Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for
Russia, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham House, Mar. 2017.

50

Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom? BBC News, Dec. 2, 2017, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.
Id.

51

Id.

52

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Yemen, (2016).
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billion dollars in revenue.53 The United States has sold similar
amounts of arms to Saudi Arabia. The US State Department
recently approved a resumption in the 300-million-dollar sale of
US-made precision-guided missiles to the Saudi government.54
Furthermore, multiple African states have expressed
disapproval of the ostensibly disproportionate targeting of African
nations since the Court’s inception. After repeated threats by
multiple African states to withdraw from the International Criminal
Court, Burundi, the Gambia, and South Africa finally signaled
their intentions to do so in 2016.55 However, whether they will
make good on their declarations is unclear.56 As of July 2017, nine
out of ten cases before the court involved African parties.57 While
it is disputed whether this treatment proportionately represents
the number of war crimes committed in Africa, this imbalance
has cast doubt upon the impartiality of the selection process.58
These are not the only cases where political
considerations have trumped ethical verdicts in referrals to the
ICC by the Security Council. Criminals in North Korea and Sri
Lanka are protected by UN delegates from China. Israeli police
perpetrating offenses against Palestinians in Israel are protected
53

54
55

56
57

58

Rasha Mohamed, The UK has made 10 times more in arms sales to Saudi Arabia than it’s given in aid to Yemen, Independent, Mar. 22, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/saudi-arabia-arms-salesyemen-war-uk-government-us-donald-trump-obama-aid-a7643066.
html.
Id.

Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the threats of withdrawal, Africa Renewal: African News and Analysis from the United Nations (May-July
2017), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-july-2017/
icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal.
Id.

Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the threats of withdrawal, Africa Renewal: African News and Analysis from the United Nations (May-July
2017), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-july-2017/
icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal.
Id.
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by US diplomats.59 Offenses that occurred in Iraq are blocked
from investigation by American and British ambassadors.60
The hindrance of justice presented by these prospective
vetoes highlights a real challenge to the Court’s effectiveness.
V. Proposals for Reform of the Security Council
and the Referral Process

In 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended
two plans for Security Council reform known as Plan A and
Plan B. Plan A called for the creation of six new permanent
members, plus three new non-permanent members, totaling
24 seats in the Council.61 Plan B called for the establishment of
eight new seats in a new class of members, who would serve
for four years, subject to renewal, plus one nonpermanent
seat, also totaling 24.62 Other calls for reform have proposed
that each geographic region of the globe be allotted an
equal number of rotating seats on the Security Council.63
Furthermore, the G4 countries Brazil, Germany, India,
and Japan are pushing for their own permanent seats on the
Council. This initiative has traditionally been opposed by the
Uniting for Consensus group, which is composed primarily of
nations that are regional rivals and economic competitors of
the G4.64 Although all of these proposals for reform have stalled
in the General Assembly or been unsuccessful due to intense
59
60
61

Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55, Stan. L. Rev. 1479
(2003).
Id.

62

Jonas von Freiesleben, A Look at the Transitional Approach to Security
Council Reform, Center for UN Reform (June 24, 2008),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council
reform/41136.html?itemid=916.

63

Id.

64

Id.

Id.
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opposition, they play a role in the debate over how the relationship
between the ICC and the Security Council should be redefined.
In determining whether to make a referral to the ICC,
the Council should act to promote justice and accountability
rather than make its referral decisions based on political
concerns. International law experts have proposed that the
Council refrain from excluding nationals from non-state parties
from jurisdiction as occurred in Darfur and should expand
its current focus from Africa to other parts of the world.65
Although these proposals for reform would address
the inequality of the distribution of power on the Security
Council and better reflect the diversifying landscape of the
international system, they would not prevent the politicization
of the ICC referral process because they do not specifically
address veto power. However, they do provide an important
framework through which this paper can address Security
Council reform. Using the ICC referral process as an important
example, this paper exposes the significant problems under
the status quo. Members of the Security Council should be
given the ability to override the veto of a permanent member
if a supermajority of the Council votes to do so. Modifying the
Security Council to allow for vetoes to be overridden will stop
the politicization of the Security Council referral process. The
permanent five members will no longer be able to arbitrarily
protect their allies from justified prosecution by the ICC.
In the majority of democratic systems, a supermajority is
calculated based on the entire membership of a body rather than
on those present and voting.66 The UN Security Council requires a
supermajority of the fixed membership on substantive matters.67
Specifying that the supermajority must be calculated according to
65

66

Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64, Case W. Res. Fac. Pub. 68
(2001).

67

Id.

Henry Schermers & Niels Blokker, International Institutional
Law: Unity Within Diversity, Fifth Revised Edition (2011).
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the fixed membership of the Security Council causes abstentions
to count as votes against. As the Security Council already defines
a supermajority in this way and a referral of a war criminal to
the ICC would fall under the definition of a substantive matter,
this recommendation uses this definition of a supermajority.
Therefore, in order for the other members of the Security Council
to override a veto by one of the permanent members, the override
would have to pass with at least nine votes in affirmation, or a
three-fifths supermajority in favor. Using this definition maintains
the central tenets of voting rules in the Security Council and sets
a high threshold for a veto to be overridden. Achieving such a
supermajority would signal that the members of the international
community represented by the states on the Security Council
overwhelmingly agree that the decision should be reversed.
Although this paper sets out to resolve the problem of
vast inequality in the distribution of power in the international
system and uses the relationship between the International
Criminal Court and the Security Council as an example, the
likelihood of Security Council reform appears extremely low. In
addition to the fact that multiple proposals for reform have been
consistently rejected, it is also very improbable that any of the
permanent five members of the Security Council would be willing
to accept a reform proposal that weakens their power.68 Allowing
the other members of the Security Council to possibly override
a veto would greatly diminish the grip that the permanent five
members have in writing and enforcing international law.69
Furthermore, a change in the Security Council would require
an amendment to the UN Charter. The amendment process is
set out in Article 108 of the Charter; amendments to the UN
Charter can only be made after two-thirds of the members of the
General Assembly vote in favor. Two thirds of the members of
the General Assembly must also ratify the new Charter according
68

69

Jakob S. Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform, Center for
UN Reform Education (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/414.
Id.
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to the specifications of their respective constitutional processes.
The five permanent members of the Security Council must be
included in this two thirds of the Assembly’s membership.70
Persuading all five of the permanent members to vote the same
way is already an impressive diplomatic feat. Also, because the
five exert a strong influence on other member states, they have
the ability to form large coalitions that could make achieving a
two-thirds majority difficult. Moreover, allowing the privileges of
the permanent five members to be limited could also potentially
undermine the functions of the Council and diminish the
already faint authority of international law.71 Finally, altering
the membership of the Security Council has the potential to
make the UN more inefficient than many believe it already is.72
However, despite its unlikelihood, such reform is
necessary to prevent blatant war criminals from escaping
justified prosecution because of their political relationships
with permanent members of the Security Council. Until
such reform is undertaken, proven war criminals like
Bashar al-Assad and Kim Jong-un will remain at the head
of governments with blatant disregard for human rights.
Furthermore, the Security Council is ill-equipped to
manage threats to international peace and stability under the
status quo. The Council’s inability to prevent recent conflicts
in Ukraine and Syria along with its impotence in dealing with
other security issues in the Middle East is evidence enough
that change is necessary. The UN’s weak response to these
crises arose because one of the permanent five members of
the Council used its veto power to prevent multilateral action,
or because the states in question refused to negotiate through
the UN on the grounds that the organization is biased and held
70
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hostage by the permanent five members.73 In short, although
the road to Security Council reform includes many seemingly
insurmountable hurdles, the continual rejection of change
could cause the UN to deteriorate into a feeble association of
squabbling states that is only issues toothless denunciations
of ever-intensifying international skirmishes. This proposal is
the best solution because it circumvents the contentious issue
of increasing the membership of the Council and adding more
permanent members with veto power, which has elicited the
greatest outcry from the current permanent five members and
factions such as the Uniting for Consensus Group. By reforming
the UN Charter in this manner, the UN’s legitimacy will be restored
and its ability to avert international conflict will be enhanced.
The current process of referring non-party states to
the ICC through the Security Council is ineffective. Although
this process was established to strengthen the ICC’s ability
to prosecute war criminals by overcoming the limitations
of territorial jurisdiction, it has allowed many criminals to
successfully escape the Court’s jurisdiction. The veto power
held by the permanent five members of the Council is used to
shield criminals from legal action for political purposes. To
remedy this dilemma, the Council should be reformed so that
the members of the Security Council can override the veto of a
permanent member with a supermajority of the 15 members
of the Council. Until such action is taken, the stated purpose
of the United Nations “to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war” and “reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights”74 will be unmet. Egregious war crimes like those that
occurred in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria will continue unabated.
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